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FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW-VERSYSS, INC. V. COOPERS
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WATCH

CLOSELY AS THE TARGET CORPORATION MAKES ITS SECURITIES
DISAPPEAR . . . OR Do THEY???

INTRODUCTION

In 1933, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securi
ties Act" or "Act").1 The purpose of the Securities Act was "to
protect the investing public and honest business" from fraud. 2 To
fulfill this purpose, the Act sought to ensure that potential investors
received information relating to securities that might be purchased
by the investors in interstate or foreign commerce. 3 Since the en
actment of the Securities Act, there has been a plethora of litigation
on the definition of a security.4 The definition of security seems
clear on its face,S yet in many cases the instrument involved does
1. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1988
& Supp. V 1993».

2. S. REp. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
3. [d. The Securities Act focuses on transactions involving securities purchased
from issuers, underwriters and dealers, and not on secondary transfers between parties.
4. The cases address this problem by deciding whether a particular financial in
strument falls within the definition of "security." See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494
U.S. 56 (1990) (questioning whether notes fall within the definition of "security"); Lan
dreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (stock); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551 (1982) (certificates of deposit); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837 (1975) (interest in state subsidized cooperative apartment corporation); SEC v.
United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (flexible fund annuities); SEC v. Vari
able Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (variable annuity contracts); SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (investment contracts); SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (fractional undivided interests in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1988). The definition of "security" is as follows:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, deben
ture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certifi
cate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust cer
tificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any
interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, op
tion, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
181

182

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:181

not easily fit within the definition.6
In Versyss, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit tackled this problem in ,the
context of a merger. Specifically, the question presented in the case
was whether stock certificates turned over by the target, or disap
pearing, corporation in a stock-for-stock merger could still be classi
fied as a "security" for purposes of finding liability under section '11
of the Securities Act. s
The majority and dissent disagreed regarding the effect that the
merger had on the stock in question. The majority held that the
stock that was turned over to the surviving corporation was no
longer a security because the effect of the merger was that the tar
get corporation ceased to exist, thus extinguishing any interest that
was in the stock before the merger. 9 The dissent agreed that the
stock interest was extinguished, but believed that the language of
the merger agreement actually gave the surviving corporation the
right to extinguish the stock. Therefore, the surviving corporation
had acquired the stock before the stock was extinguished. 10
The majority's view, while well established in existing state law
precedent, creates a gap in the application of the Securities Act.
Section I of this Note looks at the Securities Act and discusses the
as a "security," or a certific{lte of inte~est or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to sub
scribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing,
[d.

6.· See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
7. 982 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2965 (1993).
8. Id. at 654. The relevant portions of 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988) (section 11 of the
Securities A.ct) read:
(a) Persons possessing cause of action; persons liable
In case any part of the registration statenient, when such part became effec
tive, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved
that at the time of such acquisi~ion he knew of such untruth or omission) may,
either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction sue
(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar
functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of
the registration statement with respect to which ·his liability is asserted;
(4) every accountant ... who has with his consent been named as having
prepared or certified any part of the registration statement ....
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(I)-(2), (4) (19881.
9. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 655-56.
10. Id. at 659.
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reasons for its enactment. This section also examines merger law
and its effect on the securities of a corporation. Section II of this
Note discusses the facts of Versyss and explains the competing
views held by the majority and the dissent. Section III points out
the gap that the majority's deCision creates in the law and how the
dissent's reasoning would avoid this gap. Section III also recog
nizes the lack of support for the dissent's argument, and offers two
alternatives which future courts can rely on to give strength to the
dissent's argument thereby eliminating the gap that the majority
created..
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Securities Act of 1933

The main purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 is to require
full disclosure to investors so they can make prudent buying deci
sions. l l President Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed support for the
bill ina message to Congress dated March 1933, in which he wrote:
"This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the fur
ther doctrine 'let the seller also beware.' It puts the burden of tell
ing the whole truth on the seller. It should give impetus to honest
dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence."12
Following World War I, an enormous number of securities
were "floated" in the United States,13· Approximately
$25,000,000,000 worth of these securities were later found to be val
ueless. 14 This loss created great despair in many Americans' lives.
Many of those who invested in these securities lost everything in
cluding investments, homes, and confidence in the economic sys
tem. 15 The Securities Act sought to restore the confidence of the
people by requiring the registration of securities sold in interst~te
com~erce.16. The information required in a disclosure includes
"items indispensable to any accurate judgment upon the value of
the security."17
11.
12.
13.
about 50
14.
15.
16.
17.

H.R. REp. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
S. REp. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933).
H.R. REP. No. 85 at 2. The number of securities floated was estimated at
billion. Id.
Id.
Id.
S. REP. No. 47 at 2.
H.R. REP. No. 85 at 3.
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Merger Law

The Versyss court faced the problem of the effect that a merger
has on the stock of the target corporation. The precedent dealing
with this type of problem appears to be well settled. The answer to
the problem is that the stock of the target corporation ceases to
exist at the consummation of the merger.
Two cases, Frandsen v. Jensen-Sundquist Agency. IS and Shields
v. Shields,19 shed some light on this question. Both cases deal with
the same type of problem: a right of first refusal. The phrase "right
of first refusal" refers to a restriction on the ability of shareholders
to transfer their stock. 20 The restriction requires shareholders who
wish to sell their shares in a corporation first to offer their stock to
other shareholders of the corporation or to the corporation itself
before selling to a third party.21
In Frandsen, the plaintiff claimed that the corporation's major
ity stockholders had violated the. stockholders' agreement, wpich
provided that in the event the "majority bloc" offered. to sell its
stock in the company, it would first offer the stock at the same price
to Frandsen and any <;>ther of the minority stockholders. 22 Jensen
Sundquist ("Jensen") negotiated a deal with First Wisconsin Corpo
ration ("First Wisconsin") in which First Wisconsin would acquire
First Bank of Grantsburg ("First Bank"), Jensen's principal prop
erty.23 During the course of lJ.egotiations, Jensen and First Wiscon
sin structured the deal in two different ways. The second is
irrelevant to this discussion except that it was done only to avoid
triggering Frandsen's right of first refusal, which he tried to assert
after the first deal was proposed.24 The first deal consisted of First
Wisconsin purchasing Jensen for cash and then merging First Bank
into a subsidiary of First Wisconsin.25
The court found that the majority stockholders never offered
to sell "their" stock;26 they were, instead, offering to sell their larg
est holding, the bank, and not their majority interest in Jensen.
18. 802 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1986).
19. 498 A.2d 161 (Del. Ch.), appeal denied, 497 A.2d 791 (Del. 1985).
20. 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOlTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 6.6, at 6-10 (2d ed. Supp. 1993).

21. Id.
22. Frandsen, 802 F.2d at 943.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26.

[d. at 944.
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First Wisconsin was not interested in becoming a majority stock
holder in Jensen, it simply wanted to acquire the bank. 27
The court also held that "the transaction originally contem
plated by the two corporations constituted a merger.28 Merger law
in Wisconsin is similar to Delaware law in that it also states that the
acquired corporation ceases to exist at the time of merger. 29 With
that in mind, the court stated, "[the majority shareholders'] shares
would have disappeared but not by sale, for in a merger the shares
of the acquired firm are not bought, they are extinguished. "30
Shields 31 involved a family business.32 The family members
wanted to keep the business in the family, so they wrote a "right of
first refusal" requirement into an agreement.33 The dispute in
Shields arose when the business relationship between two brothers
became strained. 34 In order to circumvent the agreement, one
brother merged the corporation with a newly established corpora
tion through a stock-for-stock-merger. 35 At this point, the other
brother attempted to exercise his right of first refusal.3 6 This case
arose" from this attempt to circumvent the right of first refusal.37
The court came to a similar conclusion as reached in Frandsen,
holding that the statutory conversion of stock of the acquired com
pany in a merger did not comprise a "sale, transfer or exchange of
that stock for purposes of an agreement among shareholders re
stricting their power to transfer their stock."38 The court also con
cluded that, at the time a merger is consummated, the stock in the
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1106 (West 1992). The Delaware statute will be the
main focus of this Note because the court in Versyss focused on the Delaware statute in
its analysis.
30. Frandsen, 802 F.2d at 944.
31. Shields v. Shields, 498 A.2d 161 (Del. Ch.), appeal denied, 497 A.2d 791 (Del.
1985).
32. Id. at 163.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 163-65.
35. Id. at 165-66.
36. Id. at 166.
'37.
38.

[d.
[d. at 167. In support of this proposition, the court cited Union Chern. &

Materials Corp. v. Cannon, 148 A.2d 348 (Del. 1959). The Union Chemical court wrote
that "conversion of shares by merger is not a transfer or assignment." [d. at 352.
The court also cited Silversmiths Co. v. Reed & Barton Corp., 85 N.E. 433 (Mass.
1908). The Silversmiths court stated that "there was no 'sale' of these shares of the old
corporation to the new corporation." Id. at 434.
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acquired corporation ceases to exist.39
The Delaware statute authorizing mergers expressly requires
that the merger agreement state "the manner of converting the
shares of each of the constituent corporations into shares or other
secUrities of the corp'oration surviving."40 The definition of the
term "convert" in this context can be traced back to the Delaware
case of Federal United Corp. v. Havender. 41 This case dealt with the
issue of whether the dividend rights of preferred stockholders could
be extinguished by a merger. 42 The court concluded that the divi
dend rights, as win as other rights, could be extinguished in the
.
event the corporation wasmerged. 43
In deciding this issue, the Havender court defined "convert" to
mean "alter in form, substance or quality."44 The court viewed the
conversion not as an exchange of one security for another security,
but as an alteration of the stockholder's interest. 45 The conversion
did not occur at the time the stockholders turned in their old stock;
the conversion took place upon consummation of the merger. The
stockholder, therefore, immediately held an interest in the surviving
company.46
The conversion occurs because the stock certificate is only a
representation of the interest that the stockholder owns; it is not the
actual interest itself.47 .Theoretically, and assuming that statutes did
not require shares to be issued, corporations would not have to is
sue stock certificates in order for an individual to hold an interest in
it. The certificates simply make identifying the stockholders easier.
This allows the conversion of stock in a stock-for-stock merger to
occUr as a matter of law, without any action by the stockholder. At
the moment the merger takes place, the ~tockholder's interest is in
the new corporation.48

39. Shields, 498 A.2d at 168.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.

45.
46.

47.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)(5) (1991 & Supp. 1992).
11 A.2d 331, 338 (Del. 1940).
Id. at 333-37.
Id. at 342-43.
Id. at 338.

See id.
See id.
See BALOITI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 20, § 6.4, at 6-7.

48. 2 ERNEST L. FOLK, III ET AL., FOLK ON DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW § 251, at 16 (3d ed. 1992); BALOTII & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 20, § 9.10, at 9-18.
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v. COOPERS & LYBRAND49

A. Facts
. In May 1985, Continental Telecom, Inc. ("Contel"), a Dela
ware corporation and Northern Data Systems ("NOS"), a Massa
chusetts corporation, consummated a contract in which NOS would
be merged into a new subsidiary of Contel (also a Delaware corpo
ration).50 As consideration for the merger, NDS stockholders re
ceived Contel stock. 51 At the time the parties entered into the
agreement, NDS stock was available for public trading. .In August
1984, as part of a public offering of stock, NDS had filed a registra
tion statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") in accordance with the Securities Act of 1933.52 .
On July 16, 1985, after the NDS stockholders ratified the
agreement, NDS merged hito the subsidiary of Conte1.53 Contei ac
quired ownership of the assets and the liabilities of NDS. Pursuant
to the agreement, NDS stockholders turned in their NDS stock in
exchange for Contel stock. .The agreement between the parties
stipulated that "the 'separate corporate existence of NDS shall
terminate."'54
Following the merger, Contel realized that some of the finan
cial information contained in the registration statement of the NDS
stock was "materially misleading. "55 The accounting firm of
Coopers and Lybrand had certified this information. 56 Section 11
of the Securities Act57 "imposes ... continuing liability for misstate
ments or material omissions in registration statements."58 This stat
ute provides that a civil action may be brought by anyone
"acquiring such security" and the action may be brought against a
certain list of persons and entities including an accounting firm.59
Contel assigned the suit against Coopers and Lybrand to Ver
syss Incorporated ("Versyss").60 Versyss brought the suit in the
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

55.
56.

57.
58.
59.
60.

982 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2965 (1993).
Id. at 654.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting the merger agreement).
Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
Versyss, 982 F.2d at 654.
15 U.S.C. § 77k. See supra note 8 for the text of the statute.
Versyss, 982 F.2d at 654.
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United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.61
Coopers and Lybrand argued in its motion for summary judgment
that Conte I did not "acquire" NDS securities and, therefore, did not
qualify as a plaintiff under section 11.62 The district court and the
court of appeals acknowledged that Contel received something in
exchange for the shares it gave out to NDS stockholders. 63 Versyss
argued that Conte I had acquired the NDS stock. . Coopers and
Lybrand, on the other hand, maintained that the stock, as a result of
the merger, was nothing more than an "empty shell" and thus did
not qualify as securities under section 11 of the Securities Act. 64
The district court, following the latter view, granted Coopers and
Lybrand's summary judgment motion.65 The Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit agreed with the district court's view that the stock
was not "acquired" as required by the statute because, upon con
summation of the merger, there was no stock left to "acquire."66
Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's summary
judgment in favor of Coopers and Lybrand.
B.

The Majority's View of the Case 67

The majority began its analysis by examining the language of
section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.68 The language of the stat
ute seems very straightforward in that it cre'ates a cause of action in
a person who acquires a security.69 Thus, the question the majority
examined was whether Contel had acquired NDS' stock. To answer
this question, the court looked to state merger law.
The majority stated that, under state law, the moment the
merger went into effect, "NDS ceased to exist as a corporation."70
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

The district court opinion is unpublished.
Versyss, 982 F.2d at 654.
[d. at 654-55.
[d. at 655.
[d.
[d. at 655-56.
The majority opinion was written by Judge Boudin, and was joined by Judge
Cyr. [d. at 654.
68. [d. at 655; see supra note 8 for the text of section 11 of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.c. § 77k(a).
69. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 655. The definition of "security" is found in the Securities
Act at 15 U.S.c. § 77b(I) (1988); see supra note 5 for the text of the definition.
The majority in Versyss found that the definition was not particularly helpful in the
case at hand except that the definition called for a broad interpretation of the term
"security." Versyss, 982 F.2d at 655. The court concluded that even when utilizing a
broad construction, the term "security" had "outer limits, and those limits are strained
badly by describing what Contel acquired through the merger as a 'security.'" [d.
70. [d.
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The court inferred from this that the shares of NDS stock ceased to
exist at the same moment.71 The court also stated that the Dela
ware and Massachusetts statutes supported this view.72 The major
ity went on to state that:
It follows that, when the merger became effective, NDS stock

underwent a considerable transformation. At that point, the
NDS stock certificates ceased to represent an investment interest
in the separate assets of NDS (since it no longer existed), ceased
to reflect voting rights in the management of NDS (since NDS
ceased to have a management), and ceased to comprise a claim to
dividends declared from NDS earnings (since no such dividends
could be issued). In sum, for the NDS stock the essential charac
teristics of securities ceased to pertain. "[A]t the moment a stock
for-stock merger is effective, the stock in a constituent corpora
tion (other than the surviving corporation) ceases to exist
legally."73

The court then concluded that the NDS stock certificates which the
NDS stockholders held after the merger were evidence that the
stockholders were prior owners of NDS securities and were entitled
71. Id. The court wrote, "in a merger the shares of the acquired firm are not
bought, they are extinguished." Id. (quoting Frandsen v. Jensen-Sundquist Agency,
802 F.2d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 1986».
72. Id. The statutes are DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1991) and MASS. GEN.
L. ch. 156B, § 80(a)(1), (5) (1992).
The relevant portion of the Delaware statute is as follows:
(a) When any merger or consolidation shall have become effective under this
chapter, for all purposes of the laws of this State the separate existence of all
the constituent corporations, or of all such constituent corporations except the
one into which the other or others of such constituent corporations have been
merged, as the case may be, shall cease and the constituent corporations shall
become a new corporation, or be merged into [one] of such corporations, as
the case may be, possessing all the rights, privileges, powers and franchises as
well of a public as of a private nature, and being subject to all the restrictions,
disabilities and duties of each of such corporations so merged or consolidated;
and all and singular, the rights, privileges, powers and franchises of each of
said corporations, and all property, real, personal and mixed, and all debts due
to any of said constituent corporations on whatever account, as well for stock
SUbscriptions as all other things in action or belonging to each of such corpora
tions shall be vested in the corporation surviving or resulting from such
merger or consolidation; and all property, rights, privileges, powers and
franchises, and all and every other interest shall be thereafter as effectually the
property of the surviving or resulting corporation as they were of the several
and respective constituent corporations ....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a).
73. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 655 (emphasis added) (quoting Shields v. Shields, 498
A.2d 161, 168 (Del. Ch.), appeal denied, 497 A.2d 791 (Del. 1985».
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to receive Contel stock.14
The court sought to prove that Versyss' claim was not covered
by the Securities Act by looking at another piece of evidence in the
statutory language. 7s It examined the damages provision of section
1176 to establish that Congress did not intend to cover the merger
transaction involved in Versyss.77 The statute provides that the
measure of damages is to be the difference between the price of the
security at the time the plaintiff acquired the security and either of
the three followillgJigure!): "'(1) th~ value ... [ofthe security] as of
the time such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such secur
ity shall have been disPQsed of in the market before suit, or (3) the
priCe at which such security shall have been disposed of after. suit
but before judgment."'78
The majority concluded that in calculating the damages for a
section 11 violation, the securities must still be in the hands of the
plaintiff-buyer.79 The buyer must purchase the securities an~ then
realize the value paid was much greater than the actual value. Only
then could the buyer bring an action for damages for the loss in
value of the securities. so In the transaction between Contel and
N"DS, however, the securities ceased to exist. "It would be fantasy
to speak of the non-existent NDS securities as suffering a post
merger decline in value or being resold for less than the purchase
price."81
The court conceded, however, that some formula could be de
vised to satisfy a damages requirement in the case of a merger. 82
The United States· Court of Appeals for the First Circuit further
realized that if Contel first acquired the NDS stock and then
merged NDS into its subsidiary, there arguably could have been a
claim under section 11.83 The same problem with the damage
formula would have existed nonetheless because, under the major
ity's analysis, the stock would still have ceased to exist at the time
the merger was consummated. 84
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 656.
Id.
15 U.S.c. § 77k(e) (1988).
Versyss, 982 F.2d at 656.
78. [d. (quoting 15 U.S.c. § 77k(e)).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.
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The court concluded its analysis of the statutory language by
giving its own reflection of the complainant's real underlying prob
lem with the transaction. The majority concluded "that effective
upon the merger [Contel] acquired a package ofassets and liabilities
formerly pertaining to NDS that was worth less than Contel had
been led to belIeve. "85
The court next turned to the legislative history of the SecurIties
Act to see if it would shed some light on the dispute,86 Its analysis
of the legislative history led the court to believe that the Securities
Act ~as intended to protect "ill-informed small investors," and not
an experienced corporation which involved itself in a transaction
that was simply not covered by the Securities Act. 87 If ConteI had
undertaken a transaction that deserved section 11 protection, the
court stated that it would not deny recovery.88 However, the court
was not willing to stretch the language of the statute to allow ConteI
to recover. The court wrote as follows: "As the Supreme Court has
reminded us, the federal securities laws were not designed to pro
vide 'a broad federal remedy for all fraud."'89
The majority then addressed what it felt was the plaintiffs
strongest authority, the United States Supreme Court case of SEC
v. National Securities, Inc. 90 The plaintiff offered the case "for the
proposition that the transfer of stock in a merger is a purchase or
sale of securities under section lO(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.c.
§ 78j(b)."91 The court agreed that for purposes of section lO(b) ,
NOS did "sell" their NOS stock and "purchase" Contel stock.92
The court then went on to say, however, that there was nothing in
National Securities that suggests that Contel acquired the NOS
securities. 93
The key to the anomaly-that a sale of securities may occur with
out a purchaser of securities-is that the securities, although re
linquished by the seller are never acquired by anyone because
they cease to exist as securities (by operation of merger law) at
85. Id.
86. Id. at 656-57. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the legislative history of the Securities Act.
87. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 657.
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.S. 551, 556 (1982».
90. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
91. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 657.
92. Id. at 657-58.
93. Id. at 658.
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relinquish~d.94

The majority concluded its opinion by questioning why there· is such
a lack of precedent on this issue. It pondered whether this lack of
prior case law was a result of the fact that the acquiring corporation
rarely relies on a registration statement put out by the constituent
corporation, or simply because no one has ever thought to bring a
section 11 action in this situation. 95 The cpurt then conceded that it
would not infringe upon expectations if it were to hold Coopers and
Lybrand liable..96 ,The court realized that accountants are held to a
very high standard, but in this case the language of the statute
would be stretched too far if the court held that ConteI acquired
securities under section 11 of the Securities Act. 97 "For us, there is
greater conformity to language and less unease in concluding that a
defunct security in a non-existent corporation is not a 'security'
within the meaniilg of section 11."98
C.

The Dissent's View of the Case 99

Like the majority, the dissent in Versyss began its analysis with
the statutory language of section 110f the Securities Act. loo The
dissent particularly focused on the phrase· "acquiring [a] security"
and analyZed the plain meaning of the phrase. lOl "In its plain
meaning, 'acquire' means 'to come into possession, control, or
power of disposal of often by some uncertain or unspecified
means."'l02 The term "security" is defined in the statute l03 and the
dissent noted that the NDS stock before the merger easily fell into
this definition.l04
Thus, the dissent defined the issue as whether the plaintiff ever
attained "possession, control or power of disposal" over the stock
of the NDS shareholders. lo5 The dissent contended that the merger
94.
95.·
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The dissenting opinion was written by Judge Torruella.
Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICfIONARY 18
(1981». The dissent noted a similar definition of "acquire" in BLACK'S LAW DICfION
ARY 41 (4th ed. 1951). Versyss, 982 F.2d at 658.
103. See supra note 5 for the definition of the term "security;" 15 U.S.C.
§77(b}(1} (1988).
104. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 658-59.
105. Id. at 659.
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agreement offered help in answering this question and quoted the
agreement at section 2.2. The agreement provided that "'each
share of NDS Stock ... by virtue of the Merger and without any
action on the part of the holder thereof, [shall] be converted into
and exchanged for' Contel stoCk."l06
The dissent argued that the words "converted into and ex
changed for" signified that Contel had acquired the stock.lo7 The
dissent posited that each corporation had, by virtue of the agree
ment, purchased each other's stock,108The dissent further con
tended that it made no difference that the NOS stock ceased to
exist following the merger because "Contel acquired the stock prior
to such extinction. Indeed, ConteI gained its ability to extinguish
NDS stock as a result· of its acquisition."l09
The dissent then proceeded to argue that such a reading of the
statute furthers the purpose of the Securities Act. 110 The main pur
pose of the statute is to require disclosure so that business practices
maintain a high standard of honesty. The dissent argued that
whether there was fraud in a simple stock purchase or in a merger,
the statute was meant to protect against fraud in both cases. 111 The
dissent's final note was one of concern: concern that the majority's
ruling would lead to businesses structuring their transactions in the
form of, a merger simply to evade the liability of section 11 of the
Securities Act. 112
III.
A.

The Majority's Decision:

ANALYSIS

Creatin~

the Gap

Section 11 of the Securities Act requires that, in order for there
to. be liability, a "security" must be "acquired" by the party bringing
suit. 113 The majority in Versyss found that immediately upon con
summation of a stock-for-stock merger, the stock of the target cor
poration ceases to exist. 114 Thus, it was impossible for Contel to
have acquired NOS' stock because there was nothing left to
acquire.
106. Id. (quoting the merger agreement).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988).
114. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 655.
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The court's analysis began with the language of the statute. llS
Section 11 of the Securities Act allows any person who "acquired
[a] security" that had a misleading registration statement to bring a
civil action. 116 Thus, the majority focused on whether Contel had
acquired a security. In order to decide this issue, the majority made
a very technical analysis of state merger law.
In fact, the decision of the majority in Versyss was almost
wholly based on its interpretation of state merger law. 117 Its argu
ment focused on the effect that a merger had on the stock of the
acquired company. us Under Delaware merger law,119 the target
corporation ceases to exist at the time of the merger. 120 The major
ity's interpretation of the law is that the stock of the company also
ceases to exist immediately upon consummation of the merger. 12I
The majority looked to other evidence in the statutory lan
guage to support its case as well. It found this evidence in the dam
ages section of the Secllrities Act. 122 In doing so, the majority
pointed out a serious gap in the scope of the protection of section
11.
The majority contended that the damages section of the Securi
ties Act provides evidence that the merger in Versyss was not in
tended to be covered by the Securities ACt. I23 The court explained
that the damages formula assumes the security is in existence at the
time the suit is brought. 124 However, it conceded that in order to
calculate damages in this case, some formula could no doubt be de
veloped, especially if the case involved ConteI purchasing the NDS
stock first and then merging NDS out of existence. l25 In that case,
the securities would also have ceased to exist, but the majority
115. See supra notes 67-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the major
ity's analysis.
116. 15 u.s.c. § 77k(a}.
117. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text for the majority's merger law
analysis.
118. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 655-56.
119. This Note for the most part will limit its analysis to Delaware merger law
because the majority focuses on the Delaware merger \aw. This is evident when the
court in Versyss quotes Delaware law and in its citation implies that it believes that
Massachusetts law would lead to the ·same outcome. See, e.g., id. at 655.
120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a} (1991). See supra note 72 for the text of the
statute.
121. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 655-56.
122. [d. at 656 (citing to 15 U.S.c. § 77k(e».
123. See supra notes 75-84 and accompa~ying text.
124. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 656.

125. [d.
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pointed out that the "securities would have been 'acquired' and an
arguable claim would exist under section 11."126 This considerably
weakens the majority's damage argument because the court ac
knowledged that in a similar transaction, a damages formula would
have to be developed and could, in fact, be developed. Thus, the
majority essentially rested its decision on its technical state merger
law analysis and, in so doing, created a gap in the law.
The gap in the law that the majority has created is that if a
corporation purchases all--of the acquired corporation's stock first
and then merges with the corporation, a section 11 claim exists; but
if a corporation simply merges with the constituent corporation,
then no section 11 claim exists. The end result is the same, yet in
one 'case there is no section 11 claim under the Securities Act.
The dissent tried to avoid creating this gap in the law with its
view that the security of the target corporation in a stock~for-stock
merger surVives long enough to be "acquired" by the corporation.
Then, the security could be extinguished. While this view does not
create a gap in the law, the dissent offered no legal justification to
support its view. Thus, the question remains: is there any support
for the dissent's view?
B. Is There Support for the Dissent's View?
The'dissent recognized that the majority had created a gap in
the law, stating, "[t]heholding of the majority ... precludes the
application of [section] 11 toany··merger like the one presented
here, and thus allows parties to structure their transactions in the
form of such a merger to circumvent the application of [section]
11."127 While the dissent had the insight to recognize this problem,
it did not offer much justification for its solution.
The dissent simply considered the definitions of "acquire" and
"security" and looked to the merger agreement to conclude that the
merger agreement clearly allowed Contel to "acquire" the NDS
stock. As a result, the dissent found that a section 11 claim ex
isted. 128 The dissent was advocating a new view of the effect of a
merger on' the securities of the target company: the stock is first
acquired and then extinguished, as opposed to being extinguished
immediately at the time of merger. What follows in this section are
126. Id.
127. Id. at 659.
128. [d. at 658-59.
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two alternatives that will strengthen the dissent's view and elimi
nate the gap created in the securities law.
1.

Reconciling the Dissent's Theory with Existing Case Law

The first alternative is to attempt to reconcile the dissent's view
with existing law as characterized by the majority. The majority
relied on precedent to the effect that the stock of a target corpora
tion is extingui~hed immediately at the time of merger. The dissent
framed the issue as whether Contel ever, even for an instant, "ac
quired" or "gained possession, control or power of disposal of NDS
stoCk."129 To deal with this issue, the dissent looked to the merger
agreement. 130 The dissent believed that the words" 'converted into
and exchanged for'" sufficiently indicated that Contel had acquired
the NDS stock. l3l Indeed, the dissent believed that Contel had the
right to acquire the stock and extinguish it. 132.
There appear to be two types of cases in which this type of
dispute most often arises: (1) a dispute over the extinguishment of
stockholders' dividend rights and (2) a dispute involving the right of
first refusal. The first class of cases are easily reconcilable with the
dissent's argument because the dissent believed that the stock in a
merger was extinguished. State merger law says that when stock
from the target corporation in a merger is extinguished, the divi
dend rights of preferred stockholders are also extinguished. 133 The
dissent in Versyss argued that the stock ceases to exist after the sur
viving corporation acquires it.134 Thus, the dividend rights would
still be extinguished, albeit after the stock was acquired by the sur
viving corporation. Therefore, the life of the stock could be ex
tended by allowing the surviving corporation to first acquire the
stock and then extinguish it. The result would then be the same
because the shareholders' dividend rights would still cease to exist.
The second class of cases is also reconcilable with the dissent's
view. The right of first refusal accomplishes its purpose by requir
ing shareholders who wish to sell their stock to offer it to other
129. Id. at 659.
130. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
131. Versyss. 982 F.2d at 659 (quoting the merger agreement).
132. Id.
.
133. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
134. Id. "That the NOS stock ceased to exist following the consummation of the
merger is of no consequence because Contel acquired the stock prior to such extinction.
Indeed. Contel gained its ability to extinguish NOS stock as a result of its acquisition."
Id.
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shareholders before they can sell it to a third party who is not a
shareholder in the corporation. 13S' A merger, on the other hand,
results when one corporation is entirely absorbed by another,136 In
a merger, there is never an offer to sell or to buy one particular
shareholder's stock; the offer is to take over the entire corporation
which includes acquiring every shareholder's stoCk. 137
The Shields court made the argument that if the right of first
refusal could be triggered by a merger, then an anomaly would be
created because each shareholder would have the right to buyout
the other's shares. 138 Both the Frandsen court and the Shields court
concluded that this did not matter because the stock would cease to
exist as a result of the merger. 139 One could argue, however, that
this merger analysis is not relevant to the right of first refusal based
on the Frandsen decision. l40
In a merger, one stockholder is not offering to sell his or her
shares and the buyer is not looking to own that individual stock
holder's shares. The transaction involved is a merger of a business.
As part of the merger, as part of acquiring the whole business, the
surviving company "acquires" all of the shares of the target corpo
ration's stock. The right of first refusal would never be triggered
because at the time of merger all shareholders are simultaneously
giving up their stock to the surviving corporation. The surviving
corporation, again, acquires the stock as part of acquiring the whole
business. Once the stock is acquired, it is immediately
extinguished.
It seems as though the dissent's theory could be reconciled
with the law on which the majority relies. The main problem with
this alternative is that the law upon which the majority relies is well
. settled. The court in Versyss even characterized this view as "ordi
nary merger-law jurisprudence."141 The second alternative avoids
this problem by circumventing state corporation law. Instead, this
second solution creates federal corporation law.
135. BALOTn & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 20, § 6.6, at 6-10. See Frandsen v. Jen
sen-Sundquist Agency, 802 F.2d 941, 942-43 (7th Cir. 1986); Shields v. Shields, 498 A.2d
161, 167 (Del. Ch.), appeal denied, 497 A.2d 791 (Del. 1985).
136. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1991); see supra note 72 for the text of the
statute.
137. See Frandsen, 802 F.2d at 945.
138. Shields, 498 A.2d at 168.
139. Frandsen, 802 F.2d at 944; Shields, 498 A.2d at 168-69.
140. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
141. 982 F.2d 653, 655 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2965 (1993).
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Federal Common Law or State Law?

The majority in Versyss gave great deference to state merger
law in deciding whether ConteI actually "acquired" a "security."142
Since the inception of the securities laws, however, there has been
much debate concerning the need for federal corporation law. 143
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that in some in
stances it may be necessary to disregard state corporation law in the
interest of furt,hering federal policy.l44
The first step in the analysis is to determine which law-state
or federal-is involved in the dispute. 145 If there is a federal statute
involved, then courts should focus their efforts on providing ,a fed
eral remedy. However, this does not preclude courts from looking
to state law to fill in any gaps in the federallaw. l46 There are in
stances in which the court should try to incorporate state law into
federal law. One such instance occurs when the parties have "en-:
tered legal relationships with the expectation that their rights and
obligations would be governed by state law standards. . .. Corpo
ration law is one such area. "147
'The Court has recognized corporations to be entities wholly
created by state law. 148 Thus, there is a strong presumption that
disputes involving corporations will be governed by state law. 149
"[I]n this field congressionallegislation is generally enacted against
the background ofexisting state law; Congress has never indicated
that the entire corpus of state corporation htw is to be replaced sim
ply because a plaintiff's cause of action is based on a federal stat
ute. "150 Therefore, the existence of a .federal statute 'should not
impede the use of state corporation laws "unless the state laws per,.
mit action prohibited by the Acts, or unless 'their application would
be inconsistent with the federal policy u~derlying the cause of ac
142. See supra notes 70-74 a~d accompanying text.
143. See generally Arthur Fleischer, Ir., "Federal Corporation Law"; An Assess
ment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965); Symposium, Federal Chattering of Corporations;
An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.I. 71 (1972).
144. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., 500 U.S. 90 (1991); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S.
471 (1979); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977); 1.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
145. Burks; 441 U.S. at 475.
146. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98-99.
147. Id. at 98.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 98-99.
150. Burks, 441 U.S. at 478.

1995]

THE NEW CORPORATE MERGER TRICK

199

tion."'151 This test allows courts to limit the effect of state law
where a federal statute is involved "and yet relieves federal courts
of the necessity to fashion an entire body of federal corporat[ion]
law out of whole cloth."152
In a 1991 case, Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,153 the
Court utilized this test to decide whether the demand requirement
for a stockholder's derivative action brought under the Investment
Company Act of 1940154 should be excused. 155 The demand re
quirement dictates that before 'stockholders can bring a derivative
suit, they must make a demand on the board of directors and re
quest that the board obtain redress from the corporation. 156 The
plaintiff in Kamen argued that under state law, her demand could
be excused based on the demand futility exception. 157 The court of
appeals attempted to establish federal common law by creating a
universal demand requirement which required demand to be made
to the board of directors in all cases. 15S
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. It first
reasoned that even though the case involves a federal statute, the
demand requirement is closely connected to the distribution of cor
porate governing power and this power is inherently a product of
state law.1 59 The Court stated that the futility exception dictates the
situations in which the shareholder is allowed to bypass the board
of directors and make a management decision about whether to
bring suit. 1OO "Superimposing a rule of universal-demand over the
corporate doctrine of these States would clearly upset the balance
that they have struck between the power of the individual share
holder and the power of the directors to control corporate
litigation."161
Having decided that the demand requirement is a product of
state law, the Court n~xt had to decide whether the futility excep
151. Id. at 479 (quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465
(1975».
152. Id. at 480.
153. 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
154. 15 u.s.c. § 80a-20(a) (1988).
155. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 92.
156. 2 BALOTfI & FINKELsTEIN, supra note 20, § 13.6, at 13-14 to 13-15 (2d ed.
Supp. 1993).
'
157. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 94.
158. Id. at 94-95.
159. Id. at 101.
160. Id. at 102.
161. Id. at 103.
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tion impedes the purpose of the federal statute involved. 162 The
Court recognized that the Investment Company Act "embodies a
congressional expectation that the independent directors would
'loo[k] after the interests of the [investment company]' by 'exercis
ing the authority granted to them by state law."'163 The Supreme
Court could find "no policy in the [Investment Company] Act that
would require us to give the independent directors, or the boards of
investment companies as a whole, greater power to block share
holder derivative litigation than these actors possess under the law
of the State of incorporation."l64
Following this analysis, it is easy to see that the rules governing
mergers are also a product of state law. Each state has intricate
statutes outlining the procedure for the merger of corporations.
States include in statutes the effects that a merger will have on the
corporations involved in merger transactions. Consequently, as in
Kamen, it is necessary to consider whether the application of the
state law in this case impedes federal policy.
With the creation of the Securities Act, Congress sought to re
quire full disclosure of information which would protect investors
from fraud. 165 The policy behind the Securities Act was to ensure
that investors were provided with accurate information necessary to
make an investment decision. Moreover, investors would not be
misled into investing their money in an unprofitable enterprise. 166
The majority in Versyss took a very narrow view of who should be
protected by section 11. The majority asserted that the law was
meant to protect private investors against fraud and not to protect
sophisticated corporations involved in a complex merger agree
162. Id. at 100.
163. Id. at 107 (quoting Burks v. Lasker. 441 U.S. 471. 485 (1979)).
164. Id. at 107-08. The Court further wrote.
where a gap in'the federal securities laws must be bridged by a rule that bears
on the allocation of governing powers within the corporation. federal courts
should incorporate state law into federal common law unless the particular
state law in question is inconsistent with the policies underlying the federal
statute. The scope of the demand requirement under state law clearly regu
lates the allocation of corporate governing powers between the directors and
individual shareholders. Because a futility exception to demand does not im
pede the regulatory objectives of the [Investment Company Act]. a court that
is entertaining a derivative action under that statute must apply the demand
futility exception as it is defined by the law of the State of incorporation.
Id. at 108-09.
165. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text for the legislative history of
the Securities Act.
166. See supra notes 11~17 and accompanying text for the legislative history of
the Securities Act.

1995]

THE NEW CORPORATE MERGER TRICK

201

ment. 167 The court stated that "the federal securities laws were not
designed to provide 'a broad federal remedy for all fraud."'168
In making thi~.argument, the majority forgets that even though
the party bringing suit is a· corporation, that corporation is repre
senting its private investors. In taking on this suit, Versyss Incorpo
rated is attempting.to protect the interests of its investors.169 Also,
the legislative history indicates that Congress intended mergers of
this type to be coveI:ed by the Securities Act. In its legislative his
tory, the House of . Representatives outlined transactions that
should be exempt from the Securities Act writing,
"[r]eorganizations carried out without ... judicial supervision pos
sess all the dangers implicit in the issuance of new securities and
are, therefore, not exempt from the act. For the same reason the
[exemption] provision is not broad enough to include mergers or
consolidations of corporations entered into without judicial supervi
sion."170 Thus, even Congress reco·gnized the dangers inherent in
mergers because of the exchange of stock and believed that mergers
should not be exempt from coverage by the Securities Act.
Furthermore, the majority's narrow reading of the fraud which
Congress intended to cover with the Securities Act does not make
logical sense in light of the Versyss court's arguments. The majority
argued that section 11 was not intended to cover corporations in
volved in this type of agreement unless the corporation fit into the
language of section 1l.171 Thus, a corporation which purchases the
stock of another corporation and then merges the acquired corpo
ration into itself fits easily into the language of section 11. This
corporation, however, is no more a victim of fraud than the corpo
ration that simply merges another corporation into itself.
This case differs from Kamen. In Kamen, it was not the merits
of the plaintiffs claim under the Investment Company Act of 1940
that would have been impeded by state law. The issue of which law
to use-state or federal-focused solely on whether the plaintiff
must make a demand on the board of directors for redress before
filing a derivative action. In Kamen, the Court was not using state
law to decide whether the plaintiff would prevail on the merits of
167. Versyss, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 982 F.2d 653, 657 (1st Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2965 (1993).
168. Id. (quoting Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982».
169. Versyss, Inc. was not a party to the merger but for whatever reason, it has
been assigned the suit and must act in the interest of its shareholders.
170. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1933).
171. Versyss, 982 F.2d at 657.

202

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:181

her claim under the federal statute. The Court simply used state
law to see if the plaintiff had a right to have the merits of her claim
under the federal statute examined in a court of law. There was
nothing in the federal statute that directly addressed the issue of
demand.
In Versyss, on the other hand, by utilizing state law to interpret
the federal statute, the court directly impeded the application of the
Securities Act. The majority in Versyss used state law to directly
interpret the meaning .of the federal statute. In doing so, the poli
cies of the federal statute were thwarted. The Securities Act was
enacted to protect against fraud and by using state law to interpret
the merits of the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff was denied protection
from exactly the type of fraud the statute was meant to cover.
Even the majority itself acknowledged the possible implica
tions of its decision on the furtherance of federal policy when it
wrote that, "applying section 11 to merger acquisitions might not
unfairly upset settled expectations; under section 11, accountants
are held to demanding standards when they certify registration
statements and are liable to remote purchasers well beyond more
predictable common law liqlits."172 In the final words of its opin
ion, the majority in Versyss showed even further reluctance to reach
its conclusion. The court recognized that Contel would have had a
claim if it had acquired NDS stock in a tender offer and then
merged NOS out of existence, yet would have clearly had no claim
if Contel had simply purchased the assets of NDS.173 .The court
went on to note the following:
Faced with a merger transaction that fits neatly into neither cate
gory, any construction of the statute will leave discontinuities and
a sense of lingering unease. For us, there is greater conformity to .
language and less unease in concluding that a defunct security in
a non-existent corporation is not a "security" within the meaning
of section 11,174

Confining itself mainly to a technical analysis of state merger
law, the court was not able to find that the surviving corporation
had "acquired" a "security" within the language of section 11 of the
Securities Act. Therefore, the Versyss court could have created fed
eral common law in interpreting the words "acquiring such secur
172. Id. at 658.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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ity"175 and held that, for the purposes of the Securities Act the
surviving corporation to a merger "acquires" the target corpora
tion's securities and then the securities of the target corporation are
extinguished.
. CONCLUSION

When the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
approached the issue in Versyss with a technical analysis, it may
have neglected to consider the. future effects its decision might cre
ate. At the basis of our legal system rests the notion that the courts
should build on what has come before, that is, look to precedent,
and make a decision, with the hope that the decision. will strengthen
the law and aid future courts in making de~isions. In such a system,
inevitably a case will come about in which the decision will create a
conflict in the law that endures after it. Therefore; courts must take
care to balance efficiency against caution. Courts must take extra
precaution to ensure that their decisions will not adversely affect
surrounding law.
In Versyss, a gap was cr:eated in a federal statute through an
interpretation of state law. This Note has offered two alternatives
which would eliminate the gap. Whether these alternatives should
be followed is also a question of careful balancing. Although the
majority's analysis makes logical sense an~ is well supported by ex
isting law, the majority seemed hesitant about its own decision. 176
Our judiciary possesses a tremendous burden to get the answer
right in as little time as possible. But when judges close an opinion
doubting their decision and writing as if they are settling for the
best alternative available, it may become more important to ask
that judge to step back, think a little more, and start all over again.
William F. Giruzzi

175. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988).
176. See Versyss, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 982 F.2d 653, 658 (1st Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2965 (1993).

